Law firms and others know of the plan to transfer anti-money laundering (AML) supervision from the Solicitors Regulation Authority to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). The government’s AML and asset recovery (AMLAR) strategy said this would be a phased process to begin in late-2028. With businesses to run, clients to serve and tinned goods to stockpile, solicitors could be forgiven for putting the transfer on a ‘non-urgent’ pile of things to worry about. But the change is significant enough that some advance thinking is worthwhile.

Several things remain uncertain about the transfer. The FCA is working with the SRA and others to smooth the transition period and the inevitable overlapping of functions; anxious conversations about material subject to privilege are doubtless ongoing. But we do know about at least three key aspects of the transfer. Paying attention to these should help us all be ready when the time comes.
First is the precise scope of the FCA’s future role. This will squarely concern firms’ compliance, or otherwise, with the obligations of the money laundering regulations (MLRs), including registration, risk assessments and customer due diligence (CDD). The regulation of professional standards for individuals (and firms, insofar as this goes beyond the MLRs) will remain with the SRA, which will inevitably mean some issues and investigations straddle the two bodies.
More importantly (and counterintuitively), the FCA’s role will not extend to questions about firms’ and individuals’ compliance with laws beyond the MLRs, including the prohibitions and reporting obligations contained in the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT), the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), and sanctions regulations. So, conceivably, the FCA could investigate a firm for CDD failures, while law enforcement or sanctions implementation agencies investigate potential TACT, POCA or sanctions breaches arising from the same facts.
The second key aspect of the transfer is the FCA’s perspective as a ‘data-led’ AML supervisor. It is accustomed to regulating financial institutions whose functions generate large amounts of quantitative and measurable data, which it can use to risk-assess and target its supervisory efforts relating to higher-risk firms. Solicitor work is more varied and less suitable for such analysis. The nature of how AML risks emerge and are dealt with is inevitably more bespoke, and the evidence is more qualitative.
Insofar as these are arguments against the transfer taking place at all, we must accept that they have been ignored, in part because of difficulties in defending the SRA’s performance here. But the facts behind them present a quandary nevertheless: how to fit the ‘square peg’ of the FCA’s expectations and experience into the ‘round hole’ of solicitors’ working lives and our clients’ stories.
Related to this is the third key aspect of the transfer: that it is going ahead despite, and must not interfere with, the fundamental independence of the supervised professions. Notwithstanding its own statutory independence, the FCA may at times pursue an agenda promoted by the government of the day, which may not reflect the requirements of the law. (Arguably, the AMLAR strategy is an example, in that it suggests we prioritise reports about certain offences.) If and when this happens, it will be for solicitors stubbornly to insist on the supremacy of the latter.
What does all this mean in practice? A firm’s compliance with the MLRs begins with its written risk assessment. This process considers the firm’s bespoke and qualitative risks and how to mitigate them through policies, controls and procedures. Firms’ next periodic review of this document could usefully prompt some thinking about what measurable data those controls and procedures generate, which in turn could help the FCA (and in the meantime the SRA) be assured that firms are properly handling the (likely) majority of their clients and transactions that belong in a low-risk category.
Firms must (by law) be cognisant of the government’s views in this exercise, as expressed in its national risk assessments. They can expect the FCA and sanctions agencies to take a similar line. In the longer term, perhaps, CDD could be lighter-touch, in accordance with the AMLAR strategy.
Meanwhile, in their policies and training, and in those (hopefully) rare cases where POCA, TACT or sanctions risks crystallise into something more real, law firms will increasingly need to instruct and protect their personnel with regard to the aspects of compliance that go beyond the supervisory realm. Here, data-led compliance procedures will give way to hard, bespoke questions about professional standards and criminal liability.
With the SRA treating breaches of the MLRs as professional standards failures, we are not accustomed to thinking of compliance in this bifurcated way, with box-ticking, big data-generating procedures on one hand, and unique and difficult legal and professional stories on the other. But the legal underpinnings are already there and with the split of functions on the horizon, the time to start shifting that mindset is now.
John Binns is a partner at BCL Solicitors LLP, London
























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